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EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND THE ALIEN
TORT STATUTE—NARROW APPLICATION
PRESERVES CRUCIAL BOUNDARIES
Alicia Pitts*

I

N Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., the Fifth Circuit issued
the latest edition in a series of circuit court decisions that adopted a
restrictive “location of the conduct” formulation for the test used to
evaluate the Alien Tort Statute’s (ATS) extraterritorial application.1 The
ATS, which grants district courts original jurisdiction in “any civil action
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or
a treaty of the United States,”2 was passed in 1789.3 Despite centuries of
disuse after its passing, over the past few decades the ATS has become an
exceedingly popular means by which noncitizen parties seek compensation for wrongs committed outside of U.S. borders.4 Since 2010, the Supreme Court has issued several opinions outlining a two-step framework
to be applied by courts facing claimants alleging extraterritorial applications of U.S. law.5 The first step, which asks whether the statute rebuts
the presumption against extraterritoriality by giving a “clear indication of
an extraterritorial application,” was answered in the negative by Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., thus establishing an unswerving “presumption against extraterritoriality” for all ATS cases.6 But uncertainty regarding the second step, which asks “whether the case involves a domestic
application of the statute . . . by looking to the statute’s ‘focus,’” has led
to a major circuit split over what the statute’s “focus” should be.7 The
Fifth Circuit was correct when it joined the Second and Eleventh Circuits
in adopting a restrictive, territory-centric test because a narrow formulation of the ATS’s jurisdictional grant will preserve the legislative intent
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, 2019; B.A., B.B.A., Southern Methodist University, 2016. Thanks to my husband, Dan, and to my family and friends for always cheering me on.
1. Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 845 F.3d 184, 192–97 (5th Cir. 2017).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
3. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712–13 (2004).
4. Cortelyou C. Kenney, Measuring Transnational Human Rights, 84 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1053, 1054–56 (2015).
5. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2099–2101 (2016); Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 108, 117–24 (2013); Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd.,
561 U.S. 247, 263–70 (2010).
6. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 115, 124 (quoting Morrison, 561 U.S. at 265).
7. See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101.
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behind the ATS, promote the core principles anchoring relevant Supreme
Court precedent, respect boundaries between foreign sovereigns, and uphold constitutional delegations of foreign affairs powers.
The plaintiffs in Adhikari, all Nepali citizens, included a man named
Buddi Gurung and the “surviving family members of eleven deceased
men.”8 A Nepal-based recruiting company hired these plaintiffs in 2004
for “a hotel-related job in Jordan.”9 After each family incurred “significant debt in order to pay recruitment fees” to the Nepal-based company,
the deceased were passed along through a series of transfers into the
hands of Daoud & Partners, a Jordanian corporation who subcontracted
with Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR), a “U.S. military contractor . . .
provid[ing] staff to operate the [United States’] Al Asad Air Base (‘Al
Asad’) . . . north of Ramadi, Iraq.”10 In Jordan, the deceased were locked
into a compound, threatened, and had their passports confiscated.11
“[They] were also [informed] for the first time that they [would be] sent
. . . to work [at] Al Asad,” rather than at a hotel, for less than their promised wages.12
In August 2004, while being “transported . . . into Iraq in an unprotected automobile caravan,” the deceased “were captured by Iraqi insurgents.”13 The Iraqi insurgents “posted online videos of the [d]eceased in
which the [d]eceased said that they had been ‘trapped,’ . . . ‘deceived,’
and . . . ‘forced . . . to go to Iraq.’”14 The insurgents subsequently executed the men and posted the execution video online.15 “Plaintiff
Gurung,” who “travelled in the same automobile caravan as the
[d]eceased” but was not captured, “arrived at Al Asad,” where he
worked “as a ‘warehouse loader/unloader’ for approximately fifteen
months.”16 Gurung claimed that he was prohibited from leaving Al Asad
“until his work in Iraq was complete.”17
Plaintiffs sued Daoud and KBR in 2008, alleging negligence and violations of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) and the ATS.18 The TVPRA and ATS claims stated that the
defendants engaged in human trafficking, a violation of international law
actionable under the ATS, by “willfully and purposefully form[ing] an
enterprise with the goal of procuring cheap labor and increasing profits.”19 Although Daoud settled with the plaintiffs, KBR chose to proceed
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 845 F.3d 184, 190 (5th Cir. 2017).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 190–91.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 188–91.
Id. at 190.
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to trial.20 The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas granted KBR’s motion to dismiss the negligence claim, concluding
that it was “barred by the statute of limitations.” The TVPRA and ATS
claims, however, were allowed to continue.21 In August 2013, relying on
the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Kiobel,22 the district court
dismissed plaintiffs’ ATS claims against KBR because “all relevant conduct by Daoud and KBR occurred outside of the United States.”23 The
plaintiffs appealed after the denial of their motion for rehearing on the
ATS ruling.24
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ATS dismissal,
concluding that the plaintiffs had failed the two-part extraterritoriality
test.25 In doing so, the Fifth Circuit adopted a narrow construction of the
focus step in the ATS framework, opting to “examin[e] the conduct alleged to constitute violations of the law of nations and the location of that
conduct” in determining whether the ATS’s focus inquiry is met.26 In declining to adopt the broader formulations of step two applied by other
circuit courts, the Fifth Circuit relied primarily on RJR Nabisco, Inc. v.
European Community, a recent Supreme Court decision applying the
presumption against extraterritoriality to the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act.27 The Adhikari court held that, in the domestic application step, “[i]f we conclude that the record is devoid of any
domestic activity relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims, our analysis is complete: as
in Kiobel, the presumption against extraterritoriality bars the action.”28
Finally, the court signaled its most dramatic departure from other circuits
by stating that the illegal conduct underlying the ATS claim should not be
“conduct occurring in the territory of a foreign sovereign”29 and, instead,
must “‘occur[ ] in the United States’ rather than ‘in a foreign country.’”30
The controversy surrounding the domestic application step centers on
language from Kiobel and Morrison v. National Australian Bank Ltd.31 In
Kiobel, the Court noted that “a statutory claim might sometimes ‘touch
and concern’ the territory of the United States . . . with sufficient force to
displace the presumption.”32 In Morrison, the Court stated that, with regard to domestic application, courts should evaluate the “territorial
event” or “relationship” that was the “‘focus’ of congressional concern”
20. Id.
21. Id. at 191.
22. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 108, 117–24 (2013) (holding that “the
presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims under the ATS, and that nothing in
the statute rebuts that presumption”).
23. Adhikari, 845 F.3d at 191.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 199.
26. Id. at 195.
27. See id. (citing RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2101 (2016)).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 196 (quoting Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 108, 115 (2013)).
30. Id. (quoting RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101).
31. Id. at 194–95.
32. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 131.
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in enacting the statute.33 The Eleventh Circuit combined these tests, asking “whether ‘the claim’ and ‘relevant conduct’ are sufficiently ‘focused’
in the United States to warrant displacement and permit jurisdiction.”34
The court, accordingly, dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint, which alleged
an American company’s knowledge and financial support for extrajudicial killings committed in Colombia by Colombian nationals.35 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected the Morrison focus inquiry’s
application to ATS claims, instead choosing to apply a liberal construction of the touch-and-concern standard.36 In facts analogous to Adhikari,
where the American defendant’s involvement in the international law violation boiled down to “awareness,” the court granted plaintiffs leave to
amend their complaint to allege that “some of the activity underlying
their ATS claim took place in the United States.”37 By adopting a territory-centric approach for ATS cases, the Fifth Circuit joined the Second
and Eleventh Circuits in restricting the availability of ATS claims for
wrongs that occur primarily in foreign territories.38
The Adhikari court’s analysis addressed several allegations of “domestic conduct,” declaring each insufficient to establish a permissible domestic application of the ATS.39 Looking first to the allegations of human
trafficking, the court held that, with regard to the deceased’s family members, since the “recruitment, transportation, and alleged detention [of the
deceased] . . . all occurred in Nepal, Jordan, and Iraq,” the conduct was
insufficient as an ATS basis—”even assuming . . . [the trafficking could]
be imputed to KBR,” an American company.40 Second, the court, relying
again on Kiobel, denied plaintiff Gurung’s argument that his work at Al
Asad, an American military base, satisfied the domestic application since
Al Asad was merely temporarily controlled by the United States and thus
did not constitute “de facto” American territory.41 Finally, the court refused to accept either KBR’s alleged “aware[ness] of allegations of
human trafficking at [its] worksites” or its payments to Daoud through
New York banks as a basis for the ATS claim, reasoning that these U.S.based payments did not constitute the tortious conduct at the focus of the
ATS.42
One dissenting judge, however, argued for a broader application of the
ATS in Adhikari, contending that the majority essentially foreclosed any
33. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266 (2010).
34. Adhikari, 845 F.3d at 194–95 (quoting Doe v. Drummond Co., 782 F.3d 576, 590
(11th Cir. 2015)).
35. Baloco v. Drummond, 767 F.3d 1229, 1233, 1235–39 (11th Cir. 2014).
36. Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1028 (9th Cir. 2014).
37. Id. at 1028–29 (emphasis added).
38. Adhikari, 845 F.3d at 195 (noting that its approach “largely comports” with the
Second Circuit’s test).
39. Id. at 195–98.
40. Id. at 195–97.
41. Id. (citing Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480–82 (2004); Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605
F.3d 84, 97 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).
42. Id. at 197–98.
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possible extraterritorial application with its restrictive test.43 First, Judge
Graves noted that neither Supreme Court case addressing the ATS’s extraterritorial application had reached the second step; thus, the focus inquiry was unguided when considering cases with “potentially relevant
conduct both [inside] and outside the United States.”44 Accordingly, relying on Kiobel and Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, Judge Graves stated that
“the identity of the defendant, the nature of the defendant’s liability (direct or indirect), the type of violation alleged, and any significant connections the alleged violation has to the United States” should guide the
focus inquiry in ATS cases.45 Further, Graves argued that U.S. citizenship
of a corporate defendant should be relevant in ATS suits because foreign
policy concerns counsel in favor of remedying international law violations
abroad to avoid “implicat[ing] the United States in diplomatic conflicts.”46 Finally, he noted that the transnational nature of human trafficking, coupled with the United States’ political commitment to eradicating
the crime, support careful consideration of extraterritorial application in
this case.47
Despite the controversial and often sensitive nature of ATS claims, the
Fifth Circuit correctly interpreted the domestic application test because
the ATS should not grant jurisdiction to claimants alleging tortious conduct occurring in foreign territory. When the ATS was passed by the First
Congress in 1789, only three offenses against the law of nations were recognized: violation of safe conducts; infringement of the rights of ambassadors; and piracy, which, by its maritime nature, carries no territorial
connections.48 Moreover, the notorious international law violations both
directly preceding and immediately following the ATS’s enactment involved purely domestic events.49 Significant to appreciating the legislature’s intent in enacting the ATS is the acknowledgment that the United
States was a young nation in 1789.50 Presuming that the new leaders of
this “fledgling” nation intended the ATS to surpass its newly-established
borders and provide a forum to remedy extraterritorial tortious conduct
would be illogical.51 Consequently, a restrictive, territorially focused domestic application test, like that in Adhikari, is the only sort of test appropriate to effect the legislature’s intent.
Further, the Fifth Circuit’s restrictive test limiting ATS claims to tortious domestic conduct rightly implements the intense judicial restraint
43. Id. at 207–08 (Graves, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
44. Id. at 208–09 (citing Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124–25
(2013); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 737–38 (2004) (holding plaintiff had not
alleged an actionable violation of international law)).
45. Id. at 209.
46. Id. at 210. It should be noted here that controversy exists over whether corporations can even be liable for violations of international law. The Supreme Court will consider this question next term in Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 137 S. Ct. 1432 (2017).
47. Adhikari, 845 F.3d at 211 (Graves, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
48. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724–25.
49. See Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 117–18.
50. See id. at 123.
51. Id.
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anchoring the Supreme Court’s ATS precedent. In Sosa, for example, the
Court was careful to limit ATS jurisdiction to “only . . . alleged violations
of international law norms that are ‘specific, universal, and obligatory,’”
despite the undeniable growth in international jurisprudence since the
ATS’s enactment in 1789.52 Likewise, in Kiobel, the Court noted that
each recognition of a federal cause of action for a violation of international law carries “significant foreign policy implications”; thus, courts
must exercise “great caution” when considering ATS cases.53 The Fifth
Circuit, by requiring that the allegedly tortious conduct occur within U.S.
territory, guarantees mechanical, evenhanded evaluation of ATS cases
and respects the Court’s call to restraint.
Finally, the Fifth Circuit’s restrictive view respects both constitutional
allocations of the foreign affairs power and international territorial
boundaries. The Constitution explicitly confers authority over foreign affairs onto the legislative and executive branches.54 The ATS, a congressionally enacted law with obvious foreign affairs consequences, should
not be expanded by flexible, unmoored judicial application. The Court
has often said that “United States law governs domestically but does not
rule the world.”55 If, since the ATS’s enactment centuries ago, neither
Congress nor the President saw fit to broaden its reach to include extraterritorial conduct, why should the judiciary, whose province does not
include foreign affairs matters, adopt loose tests saying otherwise? In
fact, Kiobel noted that seven sovereign nations, including important U.S.
allies Canada and the United Kingdom, objected to the extraterritorial
application of the ATS.56 Judicial tests allowing extraterritorial application of the ATS without tortious domestic conduct would prompt serious
foreign policy consequences and impermissibly invade on the legislative
and executive realms. The Fifth Circuit’s decision preserves the boundaries between not only our branches of government but between our nation and peer nations as well.
Unlike the territory-centric focus inquiry, the application of which
boasts considerable support from Supreme Court precedent, legislative
history, and constitutional principles, champions of the Ninth Circuit’s expansive touch-and-concern inquiry base their positions on unstable
ground. These advocates primarily argue that because U.S. corporations
should not “escape liability [for extraterritorial conduct] under the ATS,”
broad domestic application inquiry is correct.57 However, while the question of corporate liability carries obvious importance to the availability of
ATS remedies, the extraterritorial application of the ATS is a discrete
52. Id. at 117 (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732).
53. Id.
54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; id. art. XI, § 2.
55. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 115 (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454
(2007)).
56. Id. at 124.
57. See, e.g., Michael L. Jones, Domesticating the Alien Tort Statute, 84 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. ARGUENDO 95, 110–15 (2016).
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legal issue entirely unrelated to the extraterritoriality debate.58 In fact,
the mere existence of corporate liability under the ATS is an unclear concept to be decided by the Supreme Court next term.59 Thus, corporate
liability for international law violations, as an unresolved, isolated issue,
forms little to no basis for broad domestic application supporters.
In summary, Adhikari provides a workable, evenhanded test that preserves the ATS’s integrity and shelters the United States from immense
foreign policy consequences. By limiting the ATS to encompass only tortious domestic conduct, the court respected centuries of precedent and
protected the boundaries set by our Constitution. While a restrictive test
may, sadly, refuse remedies to some injured parties lacking proof of tortious conduct on American territory, the political branches, not the Judicial Branch, must be responsible for opening the courts to additional
causes of action. Although Congress has not amended or supplemented
the ATS since its enactment over 200 years ago, perhaps our increasingly
globalized world and the ATS’s rise to prominence should signal that now
is the time. Until that day, however, the judiciary should proceed with
caution, understanding the consequences that may follow should it act
alone to effect such a dramatic change in centuries-old U.S. law.

58. See Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 114.
59. See Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 137 S. Ct. 1432 (2017).

